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The Hague Evidence Convention and State
Courts after Societe Nationale
Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S.
District Court: Has the Supreme
Court Unveiled a Federal Right?
"If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in
respect to other nations."
-The Federalist No. 42 (J. Madison)
I. INTRODUCTION
A clash between judicial and foreign-relation interests' occurring
in both state and federal courts led in part toward the United States
taking the lead in proposing and ratifying the Hague Convention on
the Taking of Evidence Abroad (Convention).2 The Convention was
designed "to facilitate the obtaining of evidence abroad ' 3 through a
system " 'tolerable' in the State of execution and... 'utilizable' in the
forum of the State of origin where the action is pending. ' ' 4 The Con-
vention sets forth procedures whereby a judicial authority in one con-
tracting state may request evidence located in a second state, without
offending the sovereignty of the second state. 5
Most cases involving Convention application were brought in the
1. This clash of interests is exemplified by the facts of Societe Internationale v. Rogers,
357 U.S. 197 (1958), where a Swiss "blocking statute" effectively prevented the foreign peti-
tioner from complying with the district court's discovery order unless the petitioner was will-
ing to suffer criminal penalties in Switzerland. In overturning the district court's dismissal
with prejudice of the petitioner's complaint, the United States Supreme Court took into ac-
count the need for respecting Swiss sovereignty and showed compassion for the petitioner's
lack of "willfulness, bad faith, or ... fault." Id. at 212.
2. The Hague Evidence Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Com-
mercial Matters, opened for signature, March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444
[hereinafter Convention].
3. Letter of transmittal from Richard Nixon on the Convention on the Taking of Evi-
dence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 323 (1973).
4. Explanatory Report on the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 327 (1973).
5. See id. Pre-trial discovery, as practiced in the United States, is virtually unheard of in
Europe. In most civil law countries, evidence gathering is exclusively a function of the judge
or judicial officer. See R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 443-48 (5th ed. 1988). Thus,
evidence gathering by the adverse parties might be seen by the judicial authorities in a Euro-
pean host nation as an affront.
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federal courts. 6 However, both state and federal court systems
demonstrated a lack of consistency with regard to when the Conven-
tion should apply, and whether its application was mandatory. Cer-
tain state and federal courts felt that principles of international
comity required a "rule of first resort" to Convention procedures
where an attempt was being made to discover evidence abroad.7
Other courts reasoned that where a foreign litigant was subject to the
in personam jurisdiction of an American court, any discoverable evi-
dence was technically not outside of the forum, and thus the forum's
discovery rules could not be supplanted by the Convention.8
The United States Supreme Court decided to settle the issue in
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District
Court.9 The Court held that the Convention provides an optional
method of discovery in United States district courts.10 The district
court judge now has discretion to employ this discovery method once
he has scrutinized "the particular facts, sovereign interests, and likeli-
hood that resort to those procedures will prove effective."'" The
Court rejected both the first resort rule' 2 for using the Convention
and the jurisdictional rationale for avoiding use of the Convention
6. Most of these cases were product liability suits involving foreign manufacturers with,
in some cases, United States based subsidiaries. Thus, in a case where the plaintiff might
decide to sue in state court, the defendant could choose to remove based on diversity of citizen-
ship. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (West Supp. 1985) for diversity jurisdiction and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a)(1) (West 1973) for removal jurisdiction.
7. See, e.g., Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58 (E.D.
Pa. 1983); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 176
Cal. Rptr. 874 (1981). These courts have adopted a rule of first resort, where if the Convention
procedures appear applicable, then they should be made use of until their use results in an
impasse. The rationale behind this "first resort rule" rests upon the notion of international
comity: "the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, execu-
tive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and con-
venience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection
of its laws." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
8. See, e.g., In re Ancshuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985), and Wilson v.
Lufthansa German Airlines, 108 A.D.2d 393, 489 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1985). The jurisdictional
rationale relied upon by these courts, that once the foreign party is under the court's personal
jurisdiction, the court then has plenary power to order discovery, is well established. See
Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). However, as the dissent in Societe Na-
tionale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987), points
out, this rationale ignores the strong policy established by the Convention that a court should
forego exercise of its full power to order discovery "for the purpose of furthering United States
interests and minimizing international disputes." Id. at 2560, n. 4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
9. 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987).
10. Id. at 2556.
11. Id. at 2556 (footnote omitted).
12. Id. at 2555.
Hague Evidence Convention
altogether.1 3
After first outlining the Court's holding in Societe Nationale, this
Comment will address issues relevant to the interaction between this
newly interpreted federal act and the various state courts presumably
charged with its enforcement. The analysis will initially cover ways in
which state courts are bound by federal treaties. The focus will then
shift to the Court's analysis in Societe Nationale, and how it has ar-
guably found within the Convention a federal right akin to procedural
due process. Finally, after examining the effect of the Court's holding
on the various states which have already dealt with the issue of Con-
vention usage, this Comment will conclude with a proposal for legis-
lation requiring uniform applicaton of the Convention at both state
and Federal levels.
II. THE COURT'S DECISION IN SOCIETE NATIONALE
The underlying facts of Societe Nationale are simple enough. A
French-made airplane crashed in Iowa, injuring two, and precipitat-
ing lawsuits in federal court for negligence and breach of warranty.' 4
The two defendants in that action were corporations, owned by the
Republic of France, engaged in the design and manufacture of the
suspect aircraft.' 5
After initial discovery was conducted pursuant to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure without objection, the French defendants
responded to the plaintiffs' second set of production of evidence re-
quests by filing a motion for a protective order. 16 The motion pointed
out that since the materials sought to be discovered would only be
found in France, 17 French penal law prohibited the defendants from
responding to such requests that did not comply with the Conven-
tion.18 The Magistrate denied the motion after finding that the inter-
est in protecting United States citizens from harmful foreign products
was stronger than France's interest in protecting its citizens from in-
trusive discovery, and that the former interest was best served by ap-
13. Id. at 2554.
14. Id. at 2546.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit implicitly held that the "location" of the
materials was irrelevant so long as they were within the "possession" of a litigant properly
before the court. See In re Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120, 124 (8th
Cir. 1986).
18. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 107 S. Ct.
2542, 2546 (1987).
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plication of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and not the
Convention. ' 9
The defendants next sought a writ of mandamus from the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.20 The court of appeals held that
the Convention does not apply when the district court has jurisdiction
over a foreign litigant, but noted that the Convention procedures
would still be useful for obtaining evidence from nonparties. 2' That
court rationalized that the potential overruling of a foreign court's
refusal to provide discovery would defeat rather than promote inter-
national comity.
22
Accepting the defendants' petition for certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals
and remanded the case for further proceedings.23 After a lengthy dis-
cussion of the history behind the Convention, 24 the Court acknowl-
edged that "both the discovery rules set forth in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Hague Convention are the law of the United
States."' 25 In order to decide how and when each set of discovery rules
should be applied, the Court framed four possible interactions be-
tween them: (1) exclusive use of the Convention is required "when-
ever evidence located abroad is requested for use in an American
court;" (2) the Convention "require[s] first, but not exclusive, use of
its procedures;" (3) the Convention merely "establish[es] a supple-
mental set of discovery procedures... to which concerns of [interna-
tional] comity . . . require first resort by American courts;" and
(4) the Convention should be "viewed as an undertaking among sov-
ereigns to facilitate discovery to which an American court should re-
sort when it deems that course of action appropriate, after considering
the situations of the parties ... [and] the interests of the concerned
foreign nation."
'26
The Court "reject[ed] the first two possible interpretations as in-
consistent with the language and ... history of the Hague Conven-
tion."' 27 In rejecting the third alternative, later championed by the
19. Id. at 2547.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2547-48.
23. Id. at 2557.
24. Id. at 2548-50.
25. Id. at 2550.
26. Id.
27. Id. The Court placed particular emphasis on the lack of mandatory terms in the
language of the Convention. For example, the word "may" is often used instead of "must."
[Vol. 11:207210
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dissent, the Court decided that an inflexible rule requiring first resort
to the Convention in all applicable cases would be "inconsistent with
the overriding interest in the 'just, speedy, and inexpensive determina-
tion' of litigation in our courts."' 28 The majority noted that Conven-
tion procedures, in many instances, would be dilatory and expensive,
as well as less functional than direct use of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 29 Thus, the Court declined to hold that comity requires
first resort to Convention procedures without a case by case scrutiny
of the facts, sovereign interests, and probable efficacy of resorting to
those procedures. 30 The Court required a sensitivity to sovereign in-
terests and emphasized that the foreign litigant should be given a full
and fair opportunity to demonstrate appropriate reasons for using the
optional set of procedures provided by the Convention.31
In framing the issue to be resolved in Societe Nationale, the
Court seemed to limit the effect of its holding: "The question
presented in this case concerns the extent to which a Federal District
Court must employ the procedures set forth in the Convention....
In answering this question the Court noted:
petitioners correctly assert that both the discovery rules set forth in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Hague Convention
are the law of the United States. This observation, however, does
not dispose of the question before us; we must analyze the interac-
tion between these two bodies of federal law.33
Presumably, since the Court may decide only cases and controver-
sies,34 and may not issue advisory opinions,35 the Court avoided any
28. Id. at 2555. The dissent reasoned that, in practice, domestic courts would inade-
quately perform the Court's case-by-case comity analysis because where there is any doubt,
national interests will tend to be favored over foreign interests. Id. at 2560. The dissent fur-
ther argued that there was no need for a case-by-case resort to comity principles because "the
conflicts they are designed to resolve already have been eliminated by the agreements ex-
pressed in the treaty." Id. at 2562.
29. Id. at 2555.
30. Id. at 2556.
31. Id. at 2557.
32. Id. at 2545-46 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 2550 (citation omitted).
34. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 cl. 1. The case or controversy requirement of Article III
has, since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803), been interpreted as limiting
judicial review to a function of deciding disputes between adverse parties before the court, in
which it is necessary to examine the constitutional validity of applicable legislation to resolve
the dispute at hand. See Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence ofArticle III: Perspectives on the "Case
or Controversy" Requirement, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 297 (1979).
35. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-97 (1968). The Court in Flast emphasized that
the function of federal courts was limited to questions presented in an adversarial context so as
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direct holding of the interaction between the Hague Convention and
state discovery rules.36
Thus, the question naturally arises: to what extent, if any, are
state courts bound to follow the procedures outlined by the Court in
Societe Nationale and, if they are not technically bound, does this
present a problem?
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Binding Effect of Treaties
Initially, it is important to note that treaties, like other federal
laws, are supreme and binding upon state court judges.37 Likewise, a
state law must yield to the extent that it impairs the policy of a valid
treaty.38 However, a treaty does not automatically supersede incon-
sistent local laws unless the treaty provisions are self-executing.3 9 To
determine whether a treaty is self-executing, "courts look to the intent
of the signatory parties as manifested by the language of the instru-
ment... [and] it must appear that the framers of the treaty intended
to prescribe a rule that, standing alone, would be enforceable in the
courts."40 The Court in Societe Nationale went through this analysis,
and the Court's interpretation of the treaty is most definitely binding
upon both state and federal courts:41
to assure that the courts would not intrude into areas committed to the legislative or executive
branches.
36. The Court makes several vague references to "an American court" and "any other
discovery procedures," but it is unclear from the context of these references whether the Court
is attempting to broaden the scope of its opinion to extend over state courts or to override state
discovery procedures. Even assuming that this is the case, these references would be dicta, and
therefore could not be used to directly overturn state court precedent. Thus, trying to resolve
this enigma in no way answers the question to which this Comment addresses itself: whether
state courts are bound to treat the relationship between the Convention and state discovery
rules in the same manner which district courts must now treat the interface between the Con-
vention and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
37. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. See also Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 190 (1961);
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920)
("Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the
Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under the authority of the United
States ....").
38. Pink, 315 U.S. at 231.
39. See Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314 (A treaty is "to be regarded in courts of justice
as equivalent to an Act of the Legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any
legislative provision.") See also Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
40. Sei Fujii, 38 Cal. 2d at 721-22, 242 P.2d at 620.
41. The issue of what a treaty requires is a federal question subject to Supreme Court
review. See Pink, 315 U.S. at 203, 217; L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONsTITU-
TION, at 242 (1972).
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Hague Evidence Convention
The Preamble does not speak in mandatory terms which would
purport to describe the procedures for all permissible transnational
discovery and exclude all other existing practices. The text of the
Evidence Convention itself does not modify the law of any con-
tracting State, require any contracting State to use the Convention
procedures, either in requesting evidence or in responding to such
requests, or compel any contracting State to change its own evi-
dence-gathering procedures.
42
... The Hague Convention... contains no such plain statement of
a pre-emptive intent.
43
It is clear from this interpretation that the treaty was not "intended to
prescribe a rule that, standing alone, would be enforceable in the
courts."" Implicit in the Court's determination that the Convention
"was intended to establish optional procedures" 45 is the conclusion
that the Convention was not meant to stand alone as an enforceable
rule, and therefore state rules are not necessarily superseded via the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. 46
B. The Convention's Creation of a Federal Right
However, the Court intimates that the Convention does provide
certain rights which transcend local rules. In rejecting the court of
appeals' holding that the Convention was inapplicable, the Court
noted:
It must be recalled, however that the Convention's specification of
duties in executing States creates corresponding rights in request-
ing States; holding that the Convention does not apply in this situa-
tion would deprive domestic litigants of access to evidence through
treaty procedures to which the contracting States have assented.
Moreover, such a rule would deny the foreign litigant a full and
fair opportunity to demonstrate appropriate reasons for employing
Convention procedures in the first instance, for some aspects of the
discovery process.
47
It is not readily apparent whether these guiding principles enunciated
42. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 107 S. Ct.
2542, 2550-51 (1987).
43. Id. at 2553.
44. See supra text accompanying note 40.
45. Societe Nationale, 107 S. Ct. at 2553.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
47. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 107 S. Ct.
2542, 2557 (1987).
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by the Court extend beyond a directive to the lower federal courts.
Given the Court's appraisal of the treaty as providing merely an op-
tion to the Federal Rules, the treaty's lack of expressed pre-emptive
intent, and a long tradition of state autonomy over the application of
procedural mechanisms in state courts,45 the Supreme Court seem-
ingly could not set a mandate for the states to follow. 49 Significantly,
however, the Court interprets the Convention as creating "corre-
sponding rights in requesting States." By stating that the Convention
establishes "optional procedures"50 which foreign litigants would
have "a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate appropriate reasons
for employing," the court uses language which suggests that these
'corresponding rights' are essential to fairness. 5' Thus, while the
Court states that the Convention was not pre-emptive in terms of re-
placing local rules, it interprets the Convention as having created a
federal right to have the Convention procedures fairly considered, a
right seemingly akin to procedural due process and thus guaranteed
to all parties, whether in state or federal court.
The Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process provides
procedural safeguards for the individual against the arbitrary wielding
of state power.5 2 The historic origin of these safeguards lies in the
notion that personal freedom can be preserved only through some in-
stitutional check on arbitrary government action.5 3  Early on, the
Supreme Court concluded that due process "cannot be so construed
as to leave Congress [or the states] free to make any process 'due pro-
cess of law,' by its mere will."' 54 Professor Tribe has recently identi-
fied as an "instrumental approach" to due process: "such process as
may be required to minimize 'substantially unfair or mistaken depri-
48. For a comprehensive discussion of the rationale behind this deference to state proce-
dural mechanisms, see Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742
(1982)(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
49. See, e.g., New York Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) ("It
will not be presumed that a federal statute was intended to supersede the exercise of the power
of the state unless there is a clear manifestation of intention to do so."); Burbank v. Lockheed
Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973) ("Congress legislated here in a field which the
States have traditionally occupied .... So we start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.").
50. Societe Nationale, 107 S. Ct. at 2553.
51. Id. at 2557.
52. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 10-7, at 666 (2d ed. 1988).
53. Id.
54. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276
(1855).
[Vol. 11:207214
Hague Evidence Convention
vations' of the entitlements conferred by law . . . [ensuring] that a
challenged action accurately reflects the substantive rules applicable
to such action; its point is less to assure participation than to use par-
ticipation to assure accuracy.""5 Tribe's characterization reflects the
settled idea that government may not deprive individuals of liberty or
property without providing an opportunity to be heard in a meaning-
ful time and manner,56 in order to assure an accurate and principled
basis for decision-making. The Convention was most likely intended
to achieve the same sort of assurance.
In Mathews v. Eldridge,57 the Supreme Court identified three fac-
tors which generally require consideration in resolving whether the
demands of procedural due process have been met in a given
situation:58
[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the gov-
ernment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute proce-
dural requirement would entail. 59
The analysis suggested by these three factors is strikingly similar to
the "particularized analysis," which the Court requires in Societe Na-
tionale, of "the particular facts, sovereign interests, and likelihood
that resort to [Convention] procedures will prove effective." 6  The
Court touches upon all three of the Mathews factors in reaching its
conclusion in Societe Nationale.
Beginning with the private interest factor, it is important to note
that before due process requirements apply, the private interest at
stake must be within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of lib-
erty and property. 61 Property interests are not created by the Consti-
tution, but rather stem from an independent source such as a statute
which secures certain benefits and supports a claim of entitlement to
55. L. TRIBE, supra note 52, at 667 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
56. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
57. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
58. The Court in Mathews noted that due process is not a fixed set of rules, unrelated to
time or place, but rather calls for such protections as the particular set of circumstances re-
quire. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334.
59. Id. at 335.
60. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 107 S. Ct.
2542, 2555-56 (1987).
61. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
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those benefits.62 By requiring that the foreign litigant be given an op-
portunity to demonstrate reasons for employing Convention proce-
dures in the first instance, 63 the Court in Societe Nationale suggests
that a federal law supports a claim of entitlement to the benefits of
Convention usage. The private interest at stake here is a property
interest in fairly applied discovery procedures. The Court notes that
in many instances the operation of United States' discovery rules, cou-
pled with foreign hostility toward their extraterritorial application,
could work a deprival of this interest if the Convention were entirely
unavailable.64
The second factor identified in Mathews is the risk of an errone-
ous deprivation of the private interest. In this vein, the Court in So-
ciete Nationale stresses the "special vigilance [required of American
courts] to protect foreign litigants from the danger that unnecessary,
or unduly burdensome, discovery may place them in a disadvanta-
geous position. ' 65 The Court accordingly recognizes that the private
interest in fairly applied discovery procedures is subject to a height-
ened risk of deprivation where the foreign litigant is involved. To
balance this danger, the Convention should be available as a safety
valve for those cases where the potential for abusive discovery is
greatest.
Finally, the Court identifies the Government's interest as encom-
passed within Rule One of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: "the
'just, speedy, and inexpensive determination' of litigation in our
courts. ' 66 Using Rule One as a guide, the Court notes that while
"[iln many situations the [Convention procedures] would be unduly
time consuming and expensive, ' 67 in other instances "a litigant's first
use of the Hague Convention procedures can be expected to yield
more evidence abroad more promptly than use of the normal proce-
dures governing pre-trial discovery. ' 68 As with all of these factors,
the Government's interest will have to be weighed on a case-by-case
basis.
The Court never mentions outright the possibility of a foreign
litigant being denied due process because of non-application of the
62. Id. at 577.
63. Societe Nationale, 107 S. Ct. at 2557.
64. Id. at 2556 n. 29.
65. Id. at 2557.
66. Id. at 2555.
67. Id.
68. Id. at n. 26.
[Vol. 11:207
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Convention. However, the fact that the Court held that the Conven-
tion must be fairly considered as an optional set of discovery proce-
dures, suggests that the Convention represents a property right which
cannot be deprived by the states without due process of law. If the
Court has indeed unveiled a federal right created by the Convention,
then to the extent that this creation was a valid exercise of federal
power, this federal right cannot be defeated by the forms of local prac-
tice. 69 The Convention language supports the proposition that Con-
gress intended to create a right in litigants to have the Convention
procedures available when the procedures would facilitate the ob-
taining of evidence abroad.70 Also, the Court's rejection in Societe
Nationale of the court of appeals' hard-line "does not apply" ap-
proach indicates such an intent. Therefore, the question remains:
Was the creation of this federal right a valid exercise of federal power?
C. Federal Rights and Federalism
In Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 71 the
Supreme Court was faced with a situation analogous to Societe Na-
tionale. The state of Mississippi and the Mississippi Public Service
Commission both sought a declaratory judgement that certain Titles
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 197872 (PURPA)
were unconstitutional. Mississippi argued that PURPA was beyond
the scope of congressional power under the commerce clause of the
Constitution and invaded state sovereignty in violation of the tenth
amendment. 73 PURPA was enacted to combat the nationwide energy
69. This "reverse-Erie" situation was first revealed in a line of cases dealing with the
Federal Employers' Liability Act. See, e.g., Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342
U.S. 359 (1952); Brown v. W. Ry. of Al., 338 U.S. 294 (1949); Bowman v. Illinois Cent. R.R.,
11 111. 2d 186, 142 N.E.2d 104 (1957). The interesting point of distinction is that these cases
faced the problem of state court enforcement of a "substantive right" created by Congress, and
the extent to which state rules of practice and procedure might detract from a substantive
right. Here, the federal "substantive right" is wholly concerned with procedure, and is not a
right of recovery or a right granting a cause of action as in the aforementioned cases. Thus,
the right created by the Convention, if valid, eludes the sort of labeling that animated the
typical Erie Doctrine situation.
70. See Convention, supra note 2, at 2555 ("the States signatory... [d]esiring to improve
mutual judicial cooperation in civil or commercial matters, [hlave resolved to conclude a con-
vention to this effect .... ). See also Letter of transmittal from Richard Nixon, supra note 3,
at 323 [("This convention is a significant step forward in the field of international judicial
cooperation. It will permit our courts and litigants to avail themselves of a number of im-
proved and simplified procedures for the taking of evidence.")(emphasis added)].
71. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
72. Pub. L. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117.
73. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 752 (1982).
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crisis by directing "state utility regulatory commissions and nonregu-
lated utilities to 'consider' the adoption and implementation of spe-
cific 'rate design' and regulatory standards. '74 In the Court's tenth
amendment analysis of PURPA's "Mandatory Consideration of Stan-
dards," the majority began by acknowledging "that 'the authority to
make . . .fundamental . . .decisions' is perhaps the quintessential
attribute of sovereignty. ' 75 The Court proceeded, however, to note
instances "where the Court has upheld federal statutory structures
that in effect directed state decision makers to take or to refrain from
taking certain actions," 76 and where "the Court has recognized that
valid federal enactments may have an effect on state policy-and may,
indeed, be designed to induce state action in areas that otherwise
would be beyond Congress' regulatory authority.
'77
PURPA is similar to the federal right created by the Convention
in that Congress, short of preempting state regulation of a field tradi-
tionally within the states' regulatory domain, has "adopted a less in-
trusive scheme and allowed the States to continue regulating in the
area on the condition that they consider the suggested federal stan-
dards. 78 In upholding this section of PURPA, the Court found ap-
propriate the constitutional analysis found in Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Association :79
the most that can be said is that the... Act establishes a program
of cooperative federalism that allows the States, within limits es-
74. Id. at 746.
75. Id. at 761 (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976)).
76. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 456 U.S. at 762. The Court cites Testa v. Katt,
330 U.S. 386 (1947), for the proposition that the Federal Government has some power to enlist
the States' judiciary to further federal ends.
77. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 456 U.S. at 766. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro-
politan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), does not undermine the analysis. Dealing with
the limits on Congress' authority to encroach upon purely intrastate activities involving tradi-
tional state functions, the Garcia Court rejected the long followed test enunciated in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The Garcia Court accepted National League of
Cities' argument that the states must have some inviolable island of sovereignty, but felt that
the states would be adequately protected by our representational, federal legislative process.
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556. The Court held that it was enough to support the Congressional
action by finding that it was not destructive of state sovereignty, and was not violative of any
affirmative constitutional limit on Congressional power. Id. at 554.
Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n is consistent with Garcia in that the Court is sensitive
to the states' sovereign interests while recognizing Congressional power to intrude upon that
sovereignty to some extent, limited by the Constitution. The Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n majority avoided reliance upon National League of Cities, unlike the lower court
which it reversed, and the dissent which it rejected.
78. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 765 (1982).
79. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
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tablished by federal minimum standards, to enact and administer
their own regulatory programs, structured to meet their own par-
ticular needs.8 0
Likewise, the Convention establishes a program of cooperative feder-
alism by providing that litigants in both state and federal courts shall
have the right to "demonstrate appropriate reasons for employing
Convention procedures,"' s while allowing the state courts to structure
their judicial systems as they see fit.
The Convention, like PURPA, establishes an important federal
policy. Here, the policy involves improving mutual judicial coopera-
tion with our allies.8 2 This policy would prove vulnerable should indi-
vidual states have the power to ignore the procedures designed to
implement it. As Justice Sutherland stated in United States v. Bel-
mont,8 3 "[i]n respect of all international negotiations and compacts,
and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disap-
pear."'8 4 Thus, state courts would seem bound to adhere to the federal
minimum set out in Societe Nationale for district courts.
One commentator has analyzed the problem of the enforceability
of federal rights in state courts by looking at whether the policy ex-
pressed by the federal rule outweighs the significance of the state pol-
icy on the same matter.8 5 As the Supreme Court recognized in Byrd
v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc. ,86 "countervailing fed-
eral interests may override state rules which do not express important
state policies even though in some circumstances a difference in out-
come will result."'8 7 This commentator concluded that "[u]nlike the
diversity area ... the extent of the constitutional compulsion in the
'converse Erie' situation turns on an interpretation of the statute,"88
and that "the weighing of the relevant policy considerations will oc-
cur, for all practical purposes, only once-when the statute is being
80. Id. at 289.
81. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 38.
83. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
84. Id. at 331.
85. Note, State Enforcement of Federally Created Rights, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1551, 1559-
61 (1961).
86. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
87. Note, supra note 85, at 1560. Although Byrd was addressing the converse situation of
state procedural rights in federal courts, the principle enunciated seems no less applicable
where federal procedural rights are at issue in state courts.
88. Id.
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construed." 89
The Supreme Court was forced to weigh relevant federal policies
when it interpreted the Convention as providing optional procedures
which require consideration in applicable district court cases.9°
Although the Court did not examine state court policies that might
conflict with 'its conclusion, it is hard to imagine an important state
policy that would require abstaining from consideration and use of
Convention procedures where they would legitimately facilitate the
gathering of evidence abroad. Any state policy in this case would
have to be based on protecting resident litigants from expensive and
ineffective discovery procedures. Dealing with these same conven-
ience and fairness concerns in the federal system, the Supreme Court
has decided that they will be adequately abated by discretionary con-
sideration and use of the Convention.
At least one court has concluded that the policy issues in state
court adjudications involving foreign litigants turn more upon private
rights and less upon international relation issues as determined by de-
cisions of the United States Supreme Court. In Johnston v. Compa-
gnie Generale Transatlantique,91 the New York Court of Appeals
explicitly rejected the United States Supreme Court's holding in
Hilton v. Guyot 92 as binding upon state courts. Hilton had decided
that judgments acquired in French courts were unenforceable in the
United States on the basis of reciprocity; that is, because French
courts did not give binding effect to United States court judgments.
In ignoring Hilton, the Johnston court held:
A right acquired under a foreign judgment may be established in
this State without reference to the rules of evidence laid down by
the courts of the United States. Comity is not a rule of law, but is a
rule of 'practice, convenience and expediency. It is something
more than mere courtesy, which implies only deference to the
opinion of others, since it has a substantial value in securing uni-
formity of decision, and discouraging repeated litigation of the
same question.' [citation omitted] It therefore rests, not on the
basis of reciprocity, but upon the persuasiveness of the foreign
judgment.93
89. Id. at 1561.
90. Sees Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 107
S. Ct. 2542, 2563 (1987).
91. 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121 (1926).
92. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
93. Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 387, 152 N.E. 121,
123 (1926).
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The Johnston court, in focusing on the private rights of the parties,
seemed to ignore the interplay between private rights and interna-
tional relations at work behind the Hilton decision. The court implic-
itly found that comity existed directly between the State of New York
and the Republic of France, and as such it was for New York to dis-
cern its obligations under that "rule of practice, convenience and
expediency.'94
Johnston is distinguishable from the issue presented here, in that
no legislative command was involved. However, it is worth noting as
representative of one court which concluded that states have an in-
dependent basis for relationships with foreign sovereigns; a basis
which could not always be usurped by the United States Supreme
Court acting alone. Since the decision in Societe Nationale was based
on a federal treaty, the states' independent relations with foreign sov-
ereigns are necessarily circumscribed by the Court's interpretation of
that treaty: here, that a federal right has been created for litigants in
American courts which cannot be abridged by state local rules.
IV. EFFECT ON STATE COURTS
In view of these guiding principles, state courts that previously
would have followed the reasoning in In re Anshuetz,95 that the Con-
vention has no application to parties subject to the court's in per-
sonam jurisdiction, will now be compelled to scrutinize in each case
"the particular facts, sovereign interests, and likelihood that resort to
[Convention] procedures will prove effective." ' 96
As of the date of this writing there have been seven state court
decisions which have addressed the issue of the Convention's interac-
tion with state discovery rules.97 Five out of the seven decisions have
followed the approach taken in Volkswagenwerk requiring a litigant
seeking evidence abroad to first use Convention procedures, while re-
serving the right to enforce discovery orders under the state rules
94. Id.
95. 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985).
96. Id. at 484.
97. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 176
Cal. Rptr. 874 (1981); Morton-Norwich Products v. Rhone-Poulenc, Civil Action No. 6525,
slip op. (Del. Ch. 1981); Pierburg GmbH & Co. KG v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238,
186 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1982); Vincent v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A., 193 N.J. Super. 716,
475 A.2d 686 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984); Goldschmidt v. Smith, 676 S.W.2d 443 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1984); Gebr. Eickhoff Maschinefabrik und Eisengieberei v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d 492
(W. Va. 1985); Wilson v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 108 A.D.2d 393, 489 N.Y.S.2d 575
(N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
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should Convention procedures prove ineffective. 98 The remaining two
decisions, Morton-Norwich Products v. Rhone-Poulenc99 and Wilson v.
Lufthansa German Airlines, 00 express the view enunciated in In re
Anshuetz'0 that the Convention "has no application whatsoever to
the production of evidence in this country by a party subject to [the
court's] jurisdiction." 1
0 2
A. Effect on State Courts Refusing to Apply the Convention.
A look at the leading New York state court precedent, Wilson v.
Lufthansa German Airlines, 0 3 where the court rejected use of the
Convention altogether, shows that while the application of Societe
Nationale may not have affected the result in that case, the manner in
which that result was obtained would be changed. In Wilson, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a foreign corporation, negligently
maintained a DC- 10 jet, resulting in a crash, thereby causing him in-
juries.) 4 Among the materials the plaintiff sought to discover were
"accident reports, all work and repair orders concerning the jet in-
volved in the accident, and the names and addresses of those individu-
als working on the subject aircraft."' 0 5 Upon the defendant's failure
to respond to the plaintiff's discovery requests, Special Term granted
the plaintiff's motion to compel over the defendant's objection that
the Convention "requires that discovery requests directed at foreign
corporations comply with [C]onvention procedures."'06 In affirming
the lower court's order, the appellate court emphasized that "most of
the requested documents appeared to relate to local matters emanat-
ing from the use of Lufthansa's terminal space at the New York air-
ports."' 0 7 The higher court concluded that since the documents
sought "are more likely to be located in New York, as opposed to the
West German, corporate offices of Lufthansa ... invocation of the
98. Volkswagenwerk, 123 Cal. App. 3d at 857-59.
99. No. 6525 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 1981).
100. 108 A.D.2d 393, 489 N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
101. 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985).
102. Wilson, 108 A.D.2d at 396, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 577.
103. 108 A.D.2d 393, 489 N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
104. Id. at 393-94, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
105. Id. at 394, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
106. Id. In this case, the Convention would have required the court to execute a letter of
request addressed to the competent judicial authority in West Germany. This letter would
specify the nature of the evidence requested and might request that a United States diplomatic
officer or consular agent participate in taking the evidence to be transmitted back to the New
York court.
107. Id. at 396, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 577 (emphasis added).
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Hague Evidence Convention would unduly complicate the
litigation."108
Societe Nationale seems to require greater scrutiny by the trial
court of why the defendant was unable to comply with the discovery
requests. To say that evidence is "more likely" to be located in New
York indicates that the location of the documents had not been estab-
lished. If the documents are located in the United States, and the
defendant is properly within the court's jurisdiction, then invoking
the aid of the West German judiciary would be completely unneces-
sary. 09 However, under Societe Nationale, the defendant in a case
like Wilson must be given the opportunity "to demonstrate appropri-
ate reasons for employing Convention procedures," 0 (e.g. that the
evidence is maintained in the West German offices of the parent cor-
poration). In Wilson the court rejected use of the Convention before
developing enough facts to appropriately scrutinize. Of course, it is
possible that the defendant, after being given the opportunity, will fail
to convince the court that the evidence sought is located abroad.
Under Societe Nationale, the court then has discretion to reject the use
of the Convention, and to compel discovery under the forum's discov-
ery rules. Only by first allowing the foreign defendant to present rea-
sons for Convention usage will the court be exercising that "special
vigilance to protect foreign litigants from the danger that unneces-
sary, or unduly burdensome, discovery may place them in a disadvan-
tageous position.'
B. Effect on State Courts Using the First Resort Rule.
Most of the other state courts follow the approach taken by the
California Court of Appeals in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.
Superior Court." 2 In Volkswagenwerk, the plaintiff brought suit for
injuries sustained while driving a "microbus" manufactured by the
108. Id. at 396-97, 489 N.Y.S.2d 577-78 (emphasis added).
109. The defendant in Wilson contended that the Convention was applicable to any dis-
covery requested of a foreign national.from a signatory country. Id. at 394, 489 N.Y.S.2d at
576. This contention is erroneous, as West German judicial authorities have no power to
facilitate the taking of evidence in the United States; thus, invoking their assistance for this
sort of evidence gathering would be useless, and contrary to the purposes which the Conven-
tion was designed to serve.
110. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 107 S. Ct.
2542, 2557 (1987).
111. Id.
112. 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1981).
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defendant, a West German corporation.' After "protracted discov-
ery proceedings, including several bitterly contested motions for dis-
covery orders and for sanctions," the trial court issued discovery
orders "which would require [Volkswagenwerk] to permit inspection
of its plant and documentary records, and to give other discovery, in
Wolfsburg, West Germany."' 1 4 On appeal, the defendant argued that
the orders, "even to the extent they would be valid under the Califor-
nia Discovery Act, encroach impermissibly upon the judicial sover-
eignty of West Germany.""' 5 After noting that West Germany is a
civil law state, wherein the gathering of evidence is exclusively a judi-
cial function,11 6 the court agreed that "because they conform to no
West German law, treaty, or practice ... the discovery orders...
would violate West German judicial sovereignty."
'"1 7
In dealing with this conflict, the Volkswagenwerk court admitted
that a foreign corporation subject to the court's jurisdiction "may
with technical propriety be ordered to act or to refrain from acting, in
matters relevant to the lawsuit, at places outside the state." ' s How-
ever, the court recognized a countervailing force in international
comity:
The concept that the courts of one state should not, as a matter of
sound international relations, require acts or forbearances within
the territory, and inconsistent with the internal laws, of another
sovereign state unless a careful weighing of competing interests and
alternative means makes clear that the order is justified. Rulings
based in this concept of international comity are dictated not by
technical principles of jurisdiction of the parties to or subject-mat-
ter of particular lawsuits, but rather by exercise of judicial self-
restraint in furtherance of policy considerations which transcend
individual lawsuits. 19
In order to accommodate this important concept, the court condition-
ally adopted an approach used in certain federal cases, which involves
"balancing the interests of the respective sovereignties"' 20 after "the
responding party has failed to give full discovery and seeks to avoid
113. Id.
114. Id. at 846, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
115. Id. at 851, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
116. Id. at 852, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
117. Id. at 855, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
118. Id. at 856, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 883-84.
119. Id. at 857, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
120. Id.
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sanctions by asserting the conflict of sovereign demands upon it. ' ' 121
The qualification added by the court to this approach requires that
the "initial discovery order must appear to take into account the as-
certainable requirements of the foreign state and to adopt those proce-
dures which are least likely to offend that state's sovereignty."1 22 The
Volkswagenwerk court concluded that Convention procedures should
have been followed until use of such procedures resulted in an
impasse. 
23
Unlike the approach taken in Wilson, the "first-resort" approach
adopted in California and other states appears undisturbed by the
Supreme Court's ruling in Societe Nationale. Although the Court de-
clines "to announce a new rule of law that would require first resort to
Convention procedures,"' 24 there is nothing in the decision that
would directly preclude a state court from adopting such a local rule.
Nowhere in the opinion does the Court speak of a litigant's right to
not have the Convention applied where the court otherwise finds it
appropriate.
Furthermore, whereas the Wilson approach might be seen as in-
consistent with the policy of the Convention and as contravening the
foreign relations of the United States, the Volkswagenwerk rule enthu-
siastically supports and furthers the policy embodied in the Conven-
tion. Since the "first-resort" rule is not at odds with the purpose or
policy of the Convention, and since the Court in Societe Nationale
merely "decline[s] to hold as a blanket matter that comity requires
resort to ... Convention procedures without prior scrutiny in each
case,"' 25 state courts are free to adopt a rule of first resort to the Con-
vention procedures, and consequently Societe Nationale presents no
barrier.
121. Id. at 858, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 859, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 885. See also Pierburg GmbH & Co. KG v. Superior
Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 244 (1982).
124. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 107 S. Ct.
2542, 2555 (1987). At least one court feels that the United States Supreme Court has taken the
choice out of the matter. In Sandsend Financial Consultants v. Wood, 743 S.W.2d 364 (Tex.
App. 1988), the Texas court felt bound by the high court's rejection of the rule of first-resort,
and so overturned its own first-resort precedent enunciated in Goldschmidt A.G. v. Smith, 676
S.W.2d 443 (Tex. App. 1984). In an exceedingly brief opinion, the court felt its decision was
mandated by federal supremacy in construing a treaty.
125. Societe Nationale Industrielle v. United States District Court, 107 S. Ct. 2542, 2556
(1987).
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V. CONCLUSION
In Societe Nationale, the Supreme Court has taken an important
step toward bolstering respect for the United States judicial system in
the international community by rejecting the rationale behind Wilson
and In re Anshuetz. In line with the opening quote to this Comment,
some consistency in applying the Convention is crucial toward main-
taining this respect.
If foreign investment in the United States continues to expand, it
is more than likely that various state courts around the nation will
become increasingly involved in litigation where Convention usage
will be at issue. Although arguably the holding in Societe Nationale is
strictly limited to the federal court system, the language of the opin-
ion, as well as the structured policy of the Convention, suggests
otherwise.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has at most set a federal mini-
mum, which states like California may choose to exceed. When state
courts provide differing procedural mechanisms that could variously
affect outcomes, two types of forum shopping result: parties may or
may not remove to federal court, and foreign corporations may
choose with care where they establish their businesses. Upholding the
integrity of the entire judicial system of the United States mandates
that individual states not be presented with an option as to how far
above this federal minimum they should go when their ultimate deci-
sion might have an effect on the amount of foreign investment they
attract. The states should be given as much autonomy as possible
over governance of their courts, but where United States foreign rela-
tions are involved, an overriding federal concern outweighs the need
for state autonomy.
Because consistent application of the Convention would further
its policies and goals, Congress should pass enabling legislation to es-
tablish how this Convention should be used by all United States
courts. This legislation should set specific guidelines to help the trial
judge's use of discretion. Factors for consideration should include:
(1) the sensitivity of the information sought; (2) how intrusive the
discovery would be on the sovereignty of the foreign nation (consider-
ing its particular judicial system); and (3) the consequences to the for-
eign litigant from a forced application of domestic discovery
procedures. The goal of this legislation should center around how the
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Convention can best be used to reconcile both United States' judicial
and foreign relations interests.
Aaron P. Allan

